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Partial credit guarantee schemes have experienced renewed interest 
from governments keen to promote financial access for small 
enterprises.  While the market can find uses for partial credit 
guarantees, the attractions for public policy can be illusory: indeed 
their most attractive feature for myopic politicians may be the ease 
with which the true cost of guarantees can be understated, at least at 
the outset.  In practice, the actual fiscal cost of existing schemes has 
varied widely across countries and has represented a high per dollar 
subsidy in some cases. Despite the recent application of some 
innovative techniques, the social benefit of such schemes has proved 
difficult to estimate, not least because their goals have been vague.  
Operational design has influenced the cost and apparent effectiveness 
of different schemes and has also varied widely.  Clear and precise 
goals, against which performance is regularly monitored, realistic 
pricing verified by consistent and transparent accounting, and attention 
to the incentive features of operational design, especially for the 
intermediaries, are among the prerequisites for such schemes to have a 
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1. Introduction 
With direct and directed lending programs somewhat in eclipse in recent years, the 
direct intervention mechanism of choice for SME credit activists in recent years has 
been the government-backed partial credit guarantee.  
 
According to Green (2003), well over 2000 such schemes exist in almost 100 
countries.  Thus more than half of all countries – and all but a handful of the OECD 
countries – have some form of credit guarantee scheme, usually targeted at some 
sector or category of firm which is thought to be underserved by the private financial 
sector. In addition, all of the multilateral development banks have guarantee schemes 
as well as loans and other instruments.  Such schemes seek to expand availability of 
credit to SMEs, sometimes focused on specific sectors, regions or ownership groups, 
or on young or new technology firms (or even on firms that have been hit by an 
adverse shock and risk failure). Often there is a subsidiary employment, innovation or 
productivity growth objective. 
 
But these trends likely reflect more the disappointing experience of other forms of 
intervention than any substantial body of evidence that publicly funded credit 
guarantee schemes work well.  Indeed, as has been remarked by numerous 
commentators, it is often unclear what the precise goals of these schemes are, which 
makes cost-benefit analysis highly problematic. 
  
This paper argues that guarantee schemes offer several features that are seductive for 
politicians and administrators. The family resemblance that they bear to market-based 
institutions gives them an unwarranted public legitimacy, as do the evident market 
failures that exist in small business finance.  Overoptimistic pricing and blurred 
accounting can conceal the true fiscal cost of schemes for a politically-sufficient 
duration.  Relatively small cash outlays (at least initially) can leverage large numbers 
of loans and volumes of lending for which the political system can take credit. In all 
of these dimensions guarantee schemes politically outperform direct government 
lending programs.  
 
Despite this heightened vulnerability of credit guarantee schemes to opportunistic or 
self-serving politicians, they can offer genuine advantages over direct government 
lending.  The risk-sharing element with profit-oriented intermediary banks generates 
an independent creditworthiness hurdle for borrowers, and can also help bring 
transparency inasmuch as the intermediaries are aware of the loan-loss experience.  
By outsourcing the origination and servicing of the loan to a for-profit intermediary, 
operational efficiency may be improved.  Besides, it is clear that market failure exists 
for SME lending and a well-designed and well-targeted policy intervention might 
improve welfare. 
 
Against that background, we begin (Section 2) by asking what the point of a loan 
guarantee is, pointing to the potential roles of differential information, risk-spreading 
and regulatory arbitrage in inducing the emergence of for-profit provision of such 
guarantees in the market. Section 3 turns to the diverse motivations for having 
government-sponsored schemes, considering both social welfare goals and the private 
interest of policymakers (public choice theory).  We proceed to review evidence on 
the costs of existing schemes (Section 4), noting the very wide range of outcomes that 
have been experienced worldwide.  The literature has begun to respond to earlier 
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complaints about the paucity and lack of robustness of most cost-benefit studies in 
this area.  The challenge of obtaining good benefit estimates remains, however, as we 
discuss in Section 5. The effectiveness of guarantee schemes in mobilizing the 
resources and skills of market intermediaries, and the likely benefit outcomes are 
considerably dependent on operational design (Section 6).  Concluding remarks are in 
Section 7.  We focus on guarantees for small business/small enterprise lending and in 




2.  Why the market uses credit guarantees 
Of course, credit guarantees are observed in private financial markets without explicit 
government support, as do their close cousins, credit derivatives. They emerge 
typically for one of three main reasons.  
 
−  First, because of differential information, as where the borrower’s 
creditworthiness is better known by a well-capitalized guarantor than by the 
lender. The operation of mutual guarantee associations provides an illustration 
here, as does the guaranteeing of a supplier’s borrowing by the purchaser. 
 
−  Second, as a means of spreading and diversifying risk, for example where the 
lender’s portfolio is geographically concentrated, but the guarantor has a 
diversified portfolio.  
 
−  Third, as a regulatory arbitrage.  This can occur when an unregulated firm 
provides a guarantee allowing the lender to bring an otherwise insufficiently 
secured loan into compliance with regulatory requirements or other 
government programs or financial industry risk-rating practices and 
conventions (as in US mortgage insurance
2). Another important case of 
regulatory arbitrage is when the guarantee premium is used to bring the total 
servicing charge for the loan above a regulated ceiling on lending interest rates 
and thus closer to a market-determined interest rate.
3 
 
3.  Motivation for government involvement 
 
It is less clear what specific market failure causes guarantees to be undersupplied (as 
distinct from credit in general).  Undersupply of credit generally could come from 
information problems resulting in equilibrium credit rationing as discussed in the 
famous model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  It does seem clear that lack of credit is a 
binding constraint on enterprise and SME investment, most strikingly illustrated by 
the increased enterprise and very high returns achieved by persons endowed or gifted 
                                                 
1 With their focus on the creditworthiness of foreign customers, including political risk, their wider 
diplomatic and political goals, and their potential importance, where subsidized, as distortions of trade, 
export credit guarantees raise additional questions not treated here (cf. Stephens, 1999, Auboin and 
Meier-Ewert, 2004).   
2 Regulatory requirements constraining some lenders from making uninsured mortgage loans with a 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio above 80 per cent has strengthened the private mortgage insurance (PMI) 
market in the United States, which, thanks to market conventions, also helps ensure high credit ratings 
and thus lower yields for bonds backed by high LTV mortgages that are not insured by Federal 
Agencies (Green and Wachter, 2005). 
3 There have been suggestions that this mechanism has underpinned the rapid growth in guarantee 
schemes in China in the last decade or so. 
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with additional capital sums (cf. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; McKenzie et al., 
2007). 
  
(a) Social welfare 
Government involvement in creating a credit guarantee company is often rationalized 
by the observation that SMEs commonly do not have the kinds of collateral that are 
required by bankers. Of course this statement just describes the dimension along 
which the credit guarantee operates to alter the allocation of credit.  It begs the 
question whether the resulting change in credit allocation improves overall welfare. 
 
Note, moreover, that a third-party guarantee cannot be a perfect substitute for a 
collateral of equal value in the credit appraisal. By posting a collateral of value to 
them, borrowers provide a signal of their information and intent. Furthermore, the 
existence of a valuable collateral can act as a deterrent to moral hazard thereby 
reducing the likelihood of default happening. (These points are well-known and long 
embodied in the theoretical literature, cf. Besanko and Thakor, 1987).  
 
On the other hand, banking reliance on collateral tilts the incentive for borrowers 
towards acquiring machinery which can be financed on credit; availability of a third-
party guarantee may allow the borrower to use a less capital-intensive technology if 
appropriate. 
 
Given that financial markets are not perfectly efficient, a decision by the government 
to step in, where private financiers have not found it profitable to do so, need not 
necessarily involve subsidy and fiscal outlay, though typically it does.
4  With many 
competing pressures for public funds, an economically coherent argument in favor of 
a subsidized credit guarantee system needs to go a lot further than the observation that 
such a scheme would increase availability of credit.  
 
Admittedly, by comparison with direct government lending to preferred sectors or 
types of borrowers, a partial credit guarantee has the clear potential advantage of 
sharing the credit risk and at least partially outsourcing credit appraisal to an 
independent risk-taker, namely the intermediary whose loan is being guaranteed. 
 
But the government still needs to be sure that such a scheme will increase overall 
welfare by enough to justify the subsidy cost, and not simply result in a costly 
distortion. 
 
A welfare economics perspective suggests three possible sources of from which a net 
welfare improvement could come:  
 
−  Market failure related to adverse selection. One well-known line of reasoning 
points out that a lender increasing the interest rate to protect against adverse 
selection may worsen the adverse selection to the point where further 
increases actually lower the expected return on lending.  If so, lending may be 
rationed and undersupplied relative to the social optimum, and in such 
circumstances a credit subsidy might improve overall welfare.  
                                                 
4 For example in every one of the 25 EU member states, according to Dorn (2005); 47 EU schemes are 
reviewed by Gracey (2001). 
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Note, however, that this line of reasoning is less general than is often portrayed. 
Depending on the exact nature of project risks and of the information asymmetries as 
between lenders and borrowers, the market failures might even result in more lending 
than is socially optimal (DeMeza and Webb, 1987; Besley, 1994, DeMeza 2002). The 
successful operation of MFIs charging high interest rates shows that this problem is 
not decisive in all markets. 
 
It is often remarked that a loan guarantee scheme will help the small business market 
avoid the adverse information problem that leads to credit rationing in Stiglitz and 
Weiss’ model, essentially because the interest rate will be lower.  This could 
obviously be true if the guarantor had an information advantage relative to the bank.  
But I have not seen a worked-out argument explaining how this would work for an 
unsubsidized or break-even scheme not benefiting from special information.  It is 
doubtful that the information problems facing a government-sponsored loan 
underwriter would be any less than those facing the private lender.   
 
−  Correcting for unequally distributed endowments. A distributional argument 
could also be applied. Lack of collateral is most acute for low wealth 
individuals and groups of people, and for poorer geographical areas. However, 
it is far from clear that credit allocation is the best or even a good instrument 
to correct for unequal initial endowments. 
 
Indeed, it is often noted that much of the subsidy element in government credit 
interventions is likely to go to established small business entrepreneurs or indeed to 
the shareholders of intermediary banks. 
 
Closely related to this point, though, is another subtly different rationale  
 
−  Exploiting externalities from the entrepreneurial dynamism of under-
resourced entrepreneurs.  Funding the activities of a segment of the 
population excluded from credit because of their lack of collateral and the 
inability of for-profit intermediaries to appraise them reliably could generate 
significant externalities. 
 
The goal here is, thus, not specifically to help the borrower, but to exploit the wider 
benefits which his or her activities could generate.  This dimension has an almost 
unknowable potential; nevertheless, it may represent the most coherent rationale for 
sustained intervention in the small business credit market.  On the other hand, the idea 
that extending financial access – as distinct from deepening the financial system 
overall – has a reliably strong impact on economic growth still lacks robust 
econometric evidence (Demirgűç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008). 
 
Time-bound intervention could be justified in a different way: 
 
−  Kick-starting SME lending. A kind of infant industry or learning-by-doing 
argument is also often mentioned.  SME lending is not well-developed in part 
because lenders have not accumulated the needed practical experience and the 
stock of credit information, and therefore face a lengthy loss-making start-up 
period.  Credit appraisal and management can build on experience including 
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system-wide credit history data and credit scoring.  Eventually the lenders may 
acquire sufficient skill and information to lend to the sector without subsidy. 
 
Reading between the lines of the diverse and often rather vague stated goals of 
publicly-sponsored credit guarantee schemes in the attempt to glimpse the ultimate 
objectives that their promoters had in mind,
5 one can usually detect hints of one or 
more of these economist’s arguments, perhaps most often the last one mentioned.  
Whether these goals are fully achieved and at what cost is something that has never 
been evaluated in a fully satisfactory way even after the event, much less in advance.  
Such evaluations as have been carried out focus on operational aspects such as 
ensuring on the one hand that there is sufficient take-up, but on the other hand that the 
cost of the scheme remains within bounds.   
 
Before looking more closely at estimated costs and benefits, we must also consider 
motivations other than social welfare. 
 
(b) Public choice 
 
Various levels of government, as well as non-profit agency, are involved in 
sponsoring partial credit guarantee schemes.  At one end of the scale, some schemes 
are sponsored by subnational or city governments; at the other end, all of the World’s 
regional development banks operate some form of guarantee scheme at the multi-
country level. Donor agencies to MFIs have become involved in offering cross-border 
guarantees to their client MFIs (Flaming, 2007).  Not all of these bodies are subject to 
political bias or interference, but some may be. 
 
For self-interested politicians or officials also may have an interest in using the 
establishment and operation of a credit guarantee scheme quite independently of 
social welfare considerations.   
 
Indeed, guarantee schemes offer several features that are seductive for politicians and 
administrators.  
 
−  The family resemblance that they bear to market-based institutions may confer 
in the eyes of the public an apparent legitimacy to these schemes that (given 
the failures of the past) is no longer shared by directed credit and loan subsidy 
schemes as devices to overcome the evident market failures that exist in small 
business finance.   
 
−  Overoptimistic pricing and blurred accounting can conceal the true fiscal cost 
of schemes for a politically-sufficient duration.   
 
−  Relatively small cash outlays (at least initially) can leverage large numbers of 
loans and volumes of lending for which the political system can take credit.  
 
                                                 
5 Even in the UK, the stated purpose of the government’s SFLG scheme has been simply the limited 
instrumental one of assisting “SMEs who have a viable business plan but lack the collateral necessary 
to secure the loan that they seek.”  Nitani and Riding (2005) include a convenient listing of stated goals 
of credit guarantee schemes in seven industrial economies. 
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For each of these three reasons guarantee schemes can seem to politically outperform 
direct government lending programs.
6  But they do so only to the extent that the 
schemes are publicized and accounted for in a technically deficient, non-transparent 
or meretricious way.  As such, credit guarantee schemes arouse a natural suspicion 
among policy analysts. If politicians are tempted to use credit guarantee schemes to 
conceal, dissimulate or procrastinate, then this warrants extra care in ensuring 
transparency and robust accounting for both costs and benefits if the performance of 
such schemes is to be appraised adequately. 
 
4.  Scheme costs  
The cost issue sometimes attracts less attention in the early days of the scheme. 
Indeed, as mentioned, governments are often drawn to such schemes precisely 
because the upfront cash commitment can be small in relation to the total volume of 
credit supported by such schemes. The liabilities are contingent and in the future, 
while operating costs can be covered by fees and premiums paid by beneficiaries.  
The endowment
7 of capital may be a small fraction—perhaps as low as 5 per cent—of 
the allowed total sum guaranteed, and need not be paid in cash. In due course, loan 
losses do emerge; the adequacy of the fees and premiums becomes evident only over 
time as the contingent liabilities inherent in this soft budget constraint crystallize.  
 
The most conspicuous cost comes from these underwriting losses; they are typically, 
though not always, much larger than administrative expenses.  Of course, it has long 
been recognized in official circles that accounting provision should be made for 
foreseeable losses in advance.  To quote one decade-old manual on government 
accounting for credit guarantees: “While the old method recorded guarantees only 
when a default occurred, new methods seek to anticipate losses, create reserves, and 
channel funds through transparent accounts to ensure that costs of guarantees are 
evident to decision makers” (Mody and Patro, 1996).  This principle is clearly 
embodied in the current International Financial Reporting Standards (FRS37 and 39).
8  
 
Measuring costs after the event presents fewer technical difficulties. But estimating 
the probability of future underwriting losses is not as easy as it might seem, especially 
at start-up, and this means that the application of these accounting principles still 
leaves plenty of room for over-optimism.
9   
                                                 
6 But provision of subsidized funds for on-lending has not been wholly displaced by guarantee 
schemes.  As a conspicuous example, there is the large publicly-funded SHG-bank linkage program in 
India.  This provides subsidized refinancing (by NABARD) of bank loans to self-help groups, directly 
benefiting about 14 million households, but offers no loan-loss guarantee to the bank. It offers 
liquidity, not risk-sharing.  
7 Most, though not all, schemes are funded, and leverage can be quite high – as much as 26 to 1 in 
Germany (Doran and Levitsky, 1997). 
8 These envisage that, as with all financial liabilities, financial guarantees granted should be recognized 
from the outset in the balance sheet of the guarantor at fair value plus transactions cost. Subsequently, 
the guarantees should be valued at “the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present 
obligation at the balance sheet date”.  FRS37 notes that “where the provision being measured involves 
a large population of items, the obligation is estimated by weighting all possible outcomes by their 
associated probabilities.” Quotations from the Technical Summaries of each IAS prepared by the staff 
of the IASC Foundation and posted on the website of the IASB (www.iasb.org) (as of 1 January 2007, 
accessed 4 February 2008). 
9 Even the US SBA’s long-established SME guarantee scheme (the so-called Section 7a scheme) has 
been criticized by the government auditor for inaccurate underwriting loss projections (US General 
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The basic theory is relatively clear (cf. Mody and Patro, 1996), in that providing a 
loan guarantee is like selling a put option on the project being financed. Standard 
models indicate that the fair price of such an option increases with the loan’s riskiness 
and maturity.  But, especially if the target group has not hitherto been borrowing, 
there is little experience on which to project defaults and the consequent losses.  
Furthermore, default experience is highly dependent on the state of the business cycle, 
so that it is unwise to extrapolate from the experience of a few years.  If there is a 
major economic downturn, then default rates and losses given default can soar, as was 




The net fiscal cost will tend to depend on the scope of the scheme, the extent of 
deliberate underpricing and unexpected excess underwriting losses, as well as on 
administrative efficiency. In practice there has been an enormous range of experience 
with regard to net fiscal cost, as emerges from cross country studies (such as Meyer 
and Nagarajan, 1996, Gudger, 1998, Bennett et al., 2005 and Doran and Levitsky, 
1997) and from a comparison of individual case studies.  Information is, however, 
sketchy and not fully comparable across countries.   
 
Adequacy of any given rate of charge evidently depends on system rules and 
underwriting efficiency.  Some relatively current examples referring to large schemes 
follow, suggesting a range of net fiscal cost of between zero and at least 15 per cent 
per annum of outstanding guarantees:    
 
−  The Chilean FOGAPE scheme has increased its annual charge to between 1 
and 2 per cent of the loan amount depending on the claims performance of 
participating banks: the charges have to date been sufficient to cover the 
administrative expenses of the scheme as well as claims (Benavente et al. 
2006; Bennett et al., 2005; De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler, 2007).
12  
 
−  The long-running SBA Section 7a program in the United States entails the 
equivalent of a one-time subsidy of only about 1.3 per cent of the value of the 
guaranteed loans, including provision for calls on the guarantee and operating 
expenses. This works out at about 0.1 per cent per annum of the outstanding 
stock of loans, given the average maturity of 13 years (US General 
Accounting Office, 1996),  
 
−  The annual subsidy for the Italian system SGS grew to about 1 per cent by 
2004 (Zecchini and Ventura, 2006).  
                                                                                                                                            
Accounting Office, 2001).  Curiously, though, the SBA erred on the conservative side in this matter: its 
actual underwriting losses turned out considerably lower than had been budgeted. 
10 The ill-fated Asian Securitization and Infrastructure Assurance (ASIA) Pte. Ltd., established in 1995 
by a consortium of private and public enterprises to guarantee credit losses on cross-border bond issues 
in East Asia, succumbed to the East Asian financial crisis in 1998 only three years after its 
establishment. 
11 Interest rates also prove to be a striking correlate of small loan guarantee defaults in the UK, 
according to Cowling and Mitchell (2003), who regard this finding as evidence supporting the credit  
rationing theory of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
12 Schemes in Malaysia and Thailand have also required very little subsidy over the years; on the other 
hand, several in the Philippines have recorded sizable operating losses (Adams, 2005, Gudger, 1998).   
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−  The charges of between 0.5 and 4 per cent of the sum guaranteed made by 
Mexican schemes cover only about a half of the operating costs and 
underwriting losses (Benavides and Huidobro, 2005).  
 
−  The very large Korean KCGF charges between 0.5 per cent and 2 per cent 
depending on the borrower’s credit rating, with an average of just over 1 per 
cent, but this revenue covers only a fifth of the scheme’s outlays.  Indeed the 
two major Korean schemes operated at a loss of almost 4 per cent per annum 
of the stock of outstanding guarantees in 2001-5 (Shim, 2006).   
 
−  Over the years, the (much smaller) UK SFLG scheme—which charges an 
annual 2 per cent fee—had experienced defaults on more than one in three of 
its guaranteed loans requiring a subsidy amounting in a recent year to 15 per 
cent of gross new guarantees in that year (Graham, 2004).
13   
 
In some cases, the composition of loss experience is available by size of firm.  For 
instance Riding and Haines (2001) found that, in the Canadian scheme, it was the 
larger guaranteed loans that were more likely to fail: only about 3.4 per cent of loans 
of less than C$ 25,000 defaulted, compared with a figure of more than 10 per cent for 
loans in excess of C$75,000 (before a change in scheme design in 1994).  Combined 
with their larger size, this differential default rate meant that most of the $ cost per 
loan guaranteed was incurred on the larger loans. 
 
Thus, while numerous schemes have experienced much higher than expected losses, 
heavy and unanticipated underwriting costs is by no means a universal experience of 
credit guarantee schemes (Doran and Levitsky, 1997; Bennett et al. 2005), and the 
cost of losses is not necessarily skewed towards the smallest borrowers.  This is 
consistent with the belief of many bankers that SME loan losses can be held to 
acceptable levels through good credit appraisal and monitoring practices, but that it is 
the cost per loan of appraisal and monitoring that undermines the profitability of SME 
lending.  If so, a fully-priced credit guarantee scheme may not need to be very 
expensive for the guarantor, but it may also not be enough to attract bankers into the 
market for loans to the target group. 
 
 
5.  Measuring benefits 
 
If it is difficult to estimate the likely future cost of a credit guarantee scheme, it is 
even more difficult to evaluate the social benefit that results.  Evidently the volume of 




First, there might be no additionality (sometimes called incrementality) involved even 
for the individual borrower, or for the system as a whole.  That is to say, the loans 
                                                 
13UK figure is 2003-4 outlay divided by that year’s flow of new guarantees, per Graham (2004), para. 
1.12: using average of previous 10 years’ new guarantees would give a much higher figure. 
14 This point is stressed by Bosworth et al. (1986), though their maxim, that the effect of US Federal 
Credit Programs (including guarantees) is best measured by the magnitude of the subsidy involved, is 
not particularly helpful in sorting out cost-benefit issues. 
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might have been forthcoming anyway even in the absence of the guarantee.  
Measuring the scale of this problem has been a central concern of the literature 
certainly since the 1987 survey by Levitsky and Prasad (1987) (cf. Meyer and 
Nagarajan, 1996). Some authors have been extremely skeptical (cf. Vogel and Adams, 
1997). On the other hand, additionality might be greater than the loan amount 
guaranteed, as receipt of the guarantee might leverage a much more substantial un-
guaranteed financing package.  
 
Most evaluations of guarantee schemes rely on the qualitative assessment of bankers 
and SME insiders to tell whether availability of credit to them has eased.  For 
instance, Boocock and Sharrif (2005) made a detailed study of 15 beneficiaries of the 
Malaysian scheme, seeking through interviews to judge what financing would have 
been obtained and what level of business activity reached in the absence of the 
scheme.  (This exercise produced an estimate of additionality of 37 per cent – 
appreciably lower than that obtained from a simple questionnaire administered to a 
larger set of beneficiaries.)   
 
In their study of the Canadian scheme, Riding and Haines (2001) invite the reader to 
conclude that, since less than 5 per cent of total bank loans are to “young firms”, i.e. 
those less than 1 year old, the fact that over 14 per cent of guaranteed loans under the 
Canadian SBLA scheme are to “young firms” implies additionality of at least the 9 
per cent differential.  Whether such an assertion is regarded as plausible would 
depend very much on the detailed rules of the scheme and the degree to which they 
are enforced.  After all, not all lending is eligible for the guarantee, so a mere 
diversion of all existing eligible lending into the scheme without additionality would 
tend to result in a higher share of loans in any given category of borrower over-
represented in the population of eligible borrowers.  As far as old firms are concerned, 
Riding and Haines (2001) include as additional all those respondents who both 
“believed that the firm would not have obtained the debt capital but for the SBLA and 
[…] did not hold assets that could be pledged for the loan (other than the asset being 
financed).”  They also treat as entailing additionality any respondents who believed 
they “would have failed, save for the SBLA.” Using these definitions, and 
respondents’ beliefs regarding the additional employment (typically 3-9 persons) that 
had resulted from the SBLA assistance in the following year, Riding and Haines 




In an alternative to asking borrowers whether they would have got the loan otherwise, 
for the Philippines, Saldana (2003) estimated additionality by counting only those 
loans for which bankers held amounts of collateral that fell short of total loan value.  
Only a half of the loans guaranteed by the Philippines scheme (in 1991) fell into this 
category, again suggesting significant deadweight.  Less than fully-collateralized 
loans are, of course, not a fully convincing measure of additionality. 
 
Depending on the design of the scheme and in particular on the nature of eligibility 
rules, it can sometimes be possible to use formal econometric methods to throw light 
                                                 
15 They assert that it is not difficult to argue that the incremental tax revenues from individuals and 
businesses result in significant net benefits, though this implicitly assumes a low shadow-price of labor. 
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on the question of additionality, but only a few systematic attempts seem to have yet 
been made to do this. 
 
As an example of the kind of situation that lends itself to such methods, consider the 
specific policy change in Pakistan that allowed Zia (2008) to uncover credible 
evidence of very substantial deadweight (lack of additionality) in that country’s 
scheme of subsidized credit for exporters. In this case, the key natural experiment 
allowing identification of the impact of subsidized export credit was the removal of 
one important sector, cotton yarn, from eligibility for subsidy. Apparently the 
authorities wanted to concentrate available funds on higher value-added export 
sectors. The sector – which had accounted for over one half of the 100,000 individual 
loans made in the scheme between 1998 and 2003 – survived this removal with output 
and exports almost unaffected. While some smaller, unlisted firms without multiple 
banking relationships were hit by the change, the larger firms just saw a reduction in 
their profits.  An estimated one-half of the subsidized funds had gone to financially 
unconstrained firms which did not need it. Interestingly, it was not systematically the 
less productive firms that were hit by the subsidy removal.  However, this was a 
directed credit scheme rather than a guarantee scheme per se. Finding a similar 
identifying policy change in a credit guarantee scheme would greatly help pinpointing 
additionality. 
 
Another study of the Canadian system by Riding, Madill and Haines (2007) exploits a 
more detailed dataset on loan applications to Canadian banks to arrive at a much more 
convincing estimate of additionality.  By estimating a loan denial function on data for 
loan applicants that were not eligible for the loan guarantee scheme, they are able to 
predict how many of those firms that successfully applied under the scheme would 
otherwise have been denied. (In effect, Riding et al. are here mimicking the credit 
scoring methodology that has become standard at least in advanced economies for 
appraising small business lending; cf. Berger and Frame, 2005). Based on their 
estimates and simulations, they conclude that 75 per cent of guarantees generated 
additional loans, with a 95 per cent confidence interval of +/- 9 per cent.  
 
By distinguishing between the experience of Chilean firms whose main bank began 
using the FOGAPE scheme at different times, Larraín and Quiroz (2006) estimated 
that microfirms whose bank used the FOGAPE scheme had a 14 per cent higher 
probability of getting a loan.  At the same time, Benavente et al. (2006) note evidence 
of sizable displacement in the scheme, for example, the large and growing share of 
successive guarantees being granted to the same firms.
16
 
(b) Factors other than additionality 
                                                 
16 Among other recent attempts to use quantitative information to estimate additionality is Zecchini and 
Ventura (2006), who compare data on some 4000 Italian firms eligible for the SGS guarantee scheme 
and 6000 controls – firms who because of their sector were not eligible. Estimating a regression 
equation explaining the level of bank borrowing by firm in terms of the firm’s number of employees, 
sales, tangible and intangible assets, nonbank debt, net worth and net earnings, they find that, even after 
taking account of eligibility (using an instrumental variables technique) a firm’s use of SGS guarantees 
is associated with a modestly higher level of bank borrowing (about 10-13 per cent).  Another widely-
cited econometric effort was KPMG (1999), but this looked only at assisted borrowers and did not 
include a control group.  For the US, Brash and Gallagher (2008) recently examined the post-loan 
performance of beneficiaries of SBA assistance, but again there were no control groups. 
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Secondly, even if there is additionality, it might involve such heavy loan losses or 
transactions costs as to result in net welfare losses for the economy as a whole. And 
even if fiscal costs are low, the economic costs of misallocated resources can be high. 
(In the Pakistan case, Zia calculated that diversion of unneeded credit to beneficiary 
firms could have held GDP below its potential by ¾ per cent.) 
 
Spillover effects of additional lending attributable to the scheme do need to be taken 
into account.  These could be positive or negative depending for example on whether 
the scheme had the effect of kick-starting productive activity in a specific area with 
favorable spin-offs, or whether the scheme instead promoted new producers only at 
the expense of displacing non-beneficiaries.  A macro approach to capturing all such 
spillovers is illustrated by Craig, Jackson and Thompson (2007), who use US regional 
data to detect any differential employment growth in areas which have 
disproportionately benefited  from SBA-guaranteed lending.  Their results (for the 
main Section 7a program)
17 suggest that districts with more SBA-guaranteed lending 
per $ of total bank deposits have higher employment rates.  Given the limited 
explanatory power of the underlying model to explain regional differences in 
employment rates, though, and the small size of any expected effect of the guarantee 
program, this strategy is vulnerable to omitted variables bias—and indeed the authors 
note that, absent independent data on non-guaranteed small business lending by 
district, it is impossible to rule out the interpretation that the data on SBA loan 
guarantees is simply proxying for all small business lending in the market. 
 
In section 3 above we argued that two basic rationales for government intervention to 
expand small business lending seemed most promising, namely (i) the time-bound one 
of kick-starting the financial market’s capacity and appetite for small business lending 
and (ii) the long-term one of energizing entrepreneurs excluded because of lack of 
collateral in the hope of generating dynamic medium-term externalities not easily 
captured by the market.   
 
If one or both of these is the main goal of the policy, then the data collection effort 
should focus on measuring the relevant benefits for the purpose of appraisal.  Thus, 
for the kick-starting goal, one would seek measures of increasing willingness of banks 
to make small business loans autonomously.   
 
It seems unlikely, though, that the contribution of a credit guarantee scheme to the 
long-term externalities-related goals could be reliably measured in any relevant 
operational time-frame.  Only after several years would the effects of such 
externalities be visible, and even then, the mechanisms whereby success was achieved 
would be hard to prove.  Instead, appraisal here would be better focused on 
intermediate outcomes such as the number and volume of additional loans going to 
the (hopefully clearly defined) target group, and the response of those beneficiaries in 
terms of investment, productivity, etc.  Importantly, in this case, even additionality in 
loans would not be counted as a benefit if it went to recipients other than the defined 
target group.   
 
                                                 
17 This program has about a quarter of a million loans outstanding, with an average balance per loan of 
about a quarter of a million dollars, and accounts for more than 10 per cent of the value of all small 
business loans by banks.  
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Some of the studies mentioned move in this direction.  For example, Nitani and 
Riding (2005) adduce some evidence that Japanese schemes have emphasized rescue 
situations rather than start-up or expansion situations.  This would be clear evidence 
that neither of the strategic goals mentioned above was actually being furthered by the 
policy in practice. 
 
A clear picture of the results sought by the schemes would also help implementing 
agencies adapt design features in a way more precisely conducive to achieving these 
results. 
   
6.  Operational design 
 
The operating expenses and underwriting experience of a credit guarantee scheme 
depends on the design of the scheme (as well as on the effectiveness of its 
administration). These will also affect what the scheme can achieve in terms of 
affecting the availability of credit and any other goals of the scheme.  
 
The operational dimensions are too numerous to review comprehensively, from the 
speed and reliability with which claims on the scheme are settled (Meyer and 
Nagarajan, 1996 report on schemes which paid only a few cents in the dollar on 
claims submitted by intermediaries) to pricing (systematic underpricing clearly adds 
to the fiscal cost of any such scheme).   
 
Three other design dimensions are worth commenting on: should the guarantor do any 
credit appraisal; what proportion of guarantee should be offered; and what should the 
lending criteria be in terms of sector, etc? 
 
First: the question of whether the guarantee scheme should carry out its own credit 
appraisal of each final borrower who is being guaranteed. Some of the best-regarded 
schemes do not carry out such retail assessments, instead relying on an assessment of 
the intermediary whose portfolio of loans is being guaranteed.
18  For instance, more 
than half of the guarantees (by value) provided by the US SBA are to preferred 
lenders who have authority to make guaranteed loans without prior approval of the 
SBA.  Likewise Chile’s FOGAPE does not carry out prior credit appraisals of the 
final borrowers.  In these cases, of course, the borrowers must comply with the 
eligibility criteria, but this compliance is evaluated ex post, at which point delinquent 
lenders may be penalized. Cost is certainly a consideration here: by the late 1990s, 
operating costs of the Korea Credit Guarantee Corporation, which does carry out 
retail appraisals itself, equaled 7.7 per cent of the sums guaranteed; much lower 
operating costs can be achieved if retail assessment is avoided.  Evidently a relevant 
factor is whether the guarantor has an information advantage for retail appraisal; if 
not, the second pair of eyes which it brings to bear is unlikely to be cost effective. The 
lender’s temptation to assign the worst eligible risks in its portfolio for guarantee can 
be mitigated by penalizing lenders with high claims by imposing higher future 
premium payments. 
                                                 
18 A third form is the wholesale guarantee of, for example, a bond issue by a specialized SME lender, a 
securitization of the underlying loans, or a block loan to a specialized lender by another intermediary.  
The Italian SGS provides counter-guarantees on a wholesale basis to mutual guarantee associations for 
bank loans of their members.  Accion International has had many years experience on a cross-country 
basis in wholesale guarantees of facilities provided to its local affiliates.  
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As to the rate of guarantee, this refers to the proportion of the total loan which is 
guaranteed (and related aspects such as whether the losses are shared proportionately 
between lender and guarantor, or if the guarantor covers the first or last portions).  
Many practitioners argue that the lender should retain a significant part of the risk (no 
less than 20 per cent, and preferably 30-40 per cent, according to Levitzky, 1997 and 
Green, 2003), so that there will be an incentive to conduct credit appraisal. In practice, 
most schemes offer slightly higher rates of guarantee – 70 to 80 per cent being about 
the norm – and up to 85 per cent in the case of the SBA and 100 per cent in some 
other cases (for example, Japan).  On the other hand, guarantee rates significantly less 
than 50 per cent fail to attract lenders. The Italian state scheme SGS differentiates 
guarantee rates according to assessed risk of each loan.  Scaling guarantee rates 
according to the claims experience from each lender can improve lender incentives 
without the adverse distributional impact that would result from requiring final 
borrower guarantees. Interestingly, Chile’s FOGAPE has started to auction available 
guarantee amounts with the lenders bidding on the rate of guarantee.
19  Bankers who 
bid for lower guarantee rates than the maximum allowable have their requests filled; 
others are rationed. In practice, the auctions have resulted in between 20 and 30 per 
cent of the risk retained by the primary lender (Benavente et al. 2006; Bennett et al., 
2005).  
  
There is a wide variation in the nature of the lending criteria, for example the 
categories of eligible borrower and the terms of the lending.  Some schemes have 
relatively broad eligibility rules (e.g. a ceiling on borrower size by turnover and a 
ceiling on the guarantee fund’s overall exposure to the borrower).  On the other hand, 
the US SBA has an additionality criterion according to which the lender must attest 
“to the borrower’s demonstrated need for credit by determining that the desired credit 
is unavailable to the borrower on reasonable terms and conditions from nonfederal 
sources without SBA assistance.” Other schemes attempt to achieve even more 
complex goals by defining eligibility more narrowly, with the disadvantage that it is 
less likely they can be enforced through transparent procedures.
20 And the more 
complex the criteria, the more likely opaque political interference with the granting of 
guarantees.  On the other hand, a broad criterion leaves the door open to deadweight 
in the allocation of subsidy to borrowers that had no need of it.  Restrictions on the 
lending terms, for example imposing interest ceilings, seek to limit the degree to 
which the lenders in an uncompetitive market capture rent from the scheme, but if set 
at unrealistic levels they can open the door to corrupt side-payments. In practice the 
trend has been to move towards less complicated eligibility criteria over time.  For 
instance, the Korean scheme originally operated with a restrictive positive list of 
eligible economic sectors until it shifted to a negative list criterion in 1995 and 
subsequently removed sector restrictions in 1998.   
 
                                                 
19 This can be seen as an application of the increasingly fashionable idea of auctioning a block of 
subsidy funds to the highest bidder. In finance, the risk that the beneficiary will ultimately default, 
thereby eventually paying much less than she promised, makes auctioning of rather limited application.  
It can work in the case at hand, where the block of funds and the subsidy involved is only a small part 
of the bidder’s business.  
20 The US government auditor found the SBA’s procedures for verifying the additionality criterion to 
be too broad for an adequate assessment of lending decisions (GAO, 2003). 
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Although some countries have had very extensive credit guarantee schemes, with the 
stock of guarantees in both Japan and Korea exceeding 7 per cent of GDP in 2001, 
and still in excess of 5 per cent of GDP at the time of writing,
21 schemes in most 
countries have typically covered only a small fraction of total SME lending with 
guarantees amounting to a fraction of one per cent of GDP.  Sometimes this is due to 
capacity constraints (as in the Chilean scheme which covers only about one-sixth of 
MSME lending).  In other cases it is attributable to lack of demand, which in turn can 
be traced to such features as excessive procedural costs, lack of lender confidence 
and/or delays in paying claims or narrow eligibility criteria.  
 
The lessons of operational experience suggest that government-sponsored credit 
guarantee schemes have most to show for their efforts where they have effectively 
and credibly delivered an attractive package of services to lenders, with a view to 
enhancing their capacity to lend to the underserved sector thereby propelling them to 
a sustainably higher level of lending.  Innovative pricing can induce improved results 
(for example, better loan appraisal by lenders); and – even without subsidy – demand 
from lenders may be high where the scheme operator can add value, for example by 
disseminating industry information of SME loan performance. The recent relaunch of 
FOGAPE along these lines may also owe something to the fact that it coincided with 
an increased interest of bankers in the SME sector, and with a competitive banking 
system in which relatively small operators new to SME lending had much to gain 
from the risk pooling and access to industry information offered by the guarantor.   
 
If this interpretation is correct, we may expect to see more and more schemes moving 
to broad eligibility and other criteria, reduced subsidies and more use of the portfolio 
and wholesaling approach in preference to case-by-case evaluation by the guarantor 
of retail loans. 
 
7.  Concluding remarks: good practice for credit guarantee schemes 
 
Credit guarantees have a natural place in the market and, where they are not 
sufficiently forthcoming, there may be scope for well-designed government-
sponsored schemes as part of a welfare-improving policy of government intervention 
to improve the performance of financial intermediation with respect to SMEs.  Such 
schemes will, however, never substitute for reform of the underlying institutional 
requirements of an effective credit system.  
 
The best schemes can probably survive and add value even without ongoing 
government subsidies, especially if carefully targeted on SME entrepreneurs currently 
excluded from credit for lack of collateral, and designed to provide dynamic 
incentives for market-based lenders to acquire skills in efficient and reliable appraisal 
of under-collateralized SME borrowers. 
 
But given the chequered record of such schemes in the advanced economies – and this 
is true of many other types of direct government intervention in the financial market – 
it is not just a question of avoiding unthinking transplantation of success stories; it is 
more a matter of pausing to consider whether, if success is unlikely in a favorable 
                                                 
21 Chinese guarantee funds, not all of which are publicly-backed – some resulting from regulatory 
arbitrage – were estimated to cover loans amounting to between 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2005 (Shim, 
2006). 
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governance and general institutional environment, how likely is an adaptation to work 
in the more difficult environment of the developing world? 
 
Indeed, there is a clear danger that guarantee schemes are introduced because of their 
political attractions rather than because of likely welfare improvements.  Experience 
shows that schemes can be quite costly, and these costs not widely known.  The 
benefits too are often vague and little studied.  Scheme design has varied widely and 
few schemes build in promising and readily available incentive structures. 
 
To overcome the hazards of short-termist policy, some simple good practice standards 
can be proposed.  Thus, those introducing a loan guarantee scheme should ensure (i) 
clearly defined precise and coherent welfare improvement goals; (ii) a reliable and 
realistic approach to accounting so that costs can become clear early; (iii) built-in data 
collection that allows prompt evaluation of outcomes; and (iv) attention to scheme 
design that maximizes the chance of successful goal achievement.   
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